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The Political Economy of
Late-Night Comedy
Don Waisanen

This chapter explores the degree to which comedy can speak truth to power,
especially in a time when those in power use comedy to serve their own truths.
From a systemic and institutional perspective, I position late-night comedy
television shows in the overall political economy of media. Three insights are
generated about the challenges that comedians face at a neoliberal, structural
Jevel: the expectation for institutional returns, the containment of comedy
as small revolutions , and the advance of a cynical labor that precedes and
informs modern comedy production. I conclude with some thoughts on what
]ate-night shows and their audiences might do to better serve the public interest and counter co-optations by powerful figures and institutions.
Nearly two decades ago on NBC's Saturday Night Live, a sketch called
''Conspiracy Theory Rock'' delivered a blistering critique of NBC, its parent company General Electric, media executives, and the overall concentrations of ·'media-opoly" power in mainstream networks (Conspiracy 2011 ).
Although it wasn't subtle about its targets, the show's producers and other
vetters decided that the sketch ' s comedic stylings were enough to land it a
prime time spot on national television. With a dose of institutional self-deprecation and a sense that the consequences would be as fleeting as the laughs.
the sketch aired. the show went on, and business continued-no harm done.
As this example points out, speaking truth to power is a tricky endeavor.
Speaking truth to power through comedy is even trickier. After the Brexit
vote and the election of Donald Trump to the highest office in the United
States (a result arguably attained through some comedic prowess [Bershidsky 2016]), media pundits asked a reasonable question: "Is late-night political comedy useless? " (Crouch 2016). Night after night, joke after joke, our
political comedians take to the airwaves to deliver smart and hilarious barbs
at the forces that continue to devastate our environment, promote social
159
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inequalities, and slash public services, among other issues. Given the ways
that politics and business as usual continue unperturbed, however, comedy
with the best intentions of social change can often seem like a molehill looking up at a mountain.
In a trend that shows few signs of waning. we also increasingly see those
in power using comedy to serve their own political ends. Consider how candidates such as Sarah Palin, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have been
both made fun of and performed on shows like Saturday Night Live. Comedy
by the powerful has shifted from an informal tool to a formal expectation.
Even the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency now engages in satirical tweets
(Schwartz 2015; for some historical background, see also Waisanen 2015).
Emily Nussbaum (2017) notes how
by 2016 the wheel had spun hard the other way: now it was the neo-fascist
strongman who held the microphone and an army of anonymous dirty-joke dispensers who helped put him in office. Online, jokes were powerful accelerants
for lies-a tweet was the size of a one-liner, a "dank meme·· carried farther than
any op-ed .... Ads looked like news and so did propaganda and so did actual
comedy. on both the right and the left-and every combination of the four was
labelled "satire." In a perverse twist, Trump may even have nm for President as
payback for a comedy routine: Obama's lacerating takedown of him at the 201 l
White House Correspondents' Dinner. (pars 1-2)

Comedy has always been porous in both form and content, but there are
now larger developments at hand. Nussbaum's comment indicates that comedy's boundaries have been collapsed in a swirl of players, platforms, and
policies. If anything, this suggests that scholars should be thinking more
about the higher, structural levels of influence in which political comedy
plays out.
Examining comedy in neoliberalism's context is hence a timely endeavor.
Neoliberalism has been defined as ·'the defining political economic paradigm
of our time-it refers to the policies and processes whereby a relative handful
of private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life
in order to maximize their personal profit" (McChesney 2008, 283-284). It
is "a philosophy viewing market exchange as a guide for all human action"
(Dean 2009, 51). Neoliberalism has invaded just about every sphere of modem life, from politics to religion to academia, circumscribing substance and
style to the range of what is profitable (McChesney 2008, 42 l). So it should
come as little surprise that comedy itself might be affected by the opaque
pressures of neoliberal structures.
While I'm generally supportive of political comedy, my previous work
has analyzed the problems with crossing politics and comedy from a textual
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perspective, recognizing that all types of communication have limitations
and tradeoffs (e.g., comedy's fixation with distortion and difficulties in
dealing with complexity) (see Waisanen 2013a). In this chapter, I use the
"political economy of media" as a perspective for thinking about how
comedy's potential for social change can be thought about from a higher,
structural viewpoint, especially when positioned within neoliberalism' s
architectures and offshoots. Scholarly work on comedy more often than not
looks to single texts or audience reception to address how comedy works
and what it does (Becker and Waisanen 2013). A next step is to focus on
how neoliberalism affects political comedy, especially in late-night shows
that act as one of the main platforms for developing and repeating certain
systemic commitments.
Political economists of media tend to think about the role that systems
and institutions play in media and depoliticization (McChesney 2008, 12).
My goal here is less to examine the specifics of policies than to think more
structurally about political comedy as a heuristic lens for examining latenight comedy shows. Ultimately, "The central question for media political
economists is whether, on balance, the media system serves to promote or
undermine democratic institutions and practices ....
And equipped with
that knowledge, what are the options for citizens to address the situation"
(McChesney 2008, 12). With these questions in mind, I point toward "the
discourses of the social structure which clearly have an existence which is
in some measure at ]east independent of comic texts" (Palmer 1987, 59-60).
I only bring up examples from shows, particular jokes or bits, or other features as illustrative of more general problems in comedy's wranglings with
neolibera]ism writ large. Part analysis , pa11 thought experiment, I offer three
interlocking themes about late-night shows in the political economy of media
that would largely remain hidden without a structural criticism. I conclude with
thoughts on what comedy producers and audiences might do to better serve the
public interest and counter co-optations by powerful figures and institutions.

INSTITUTIONAL RETURN
Late-night shows answer to institutional profits. Amidst· all the comedy writing and performance that carries through our airwaves, profit-making still
remains the core concern around which most work transpires . Although this
fact is seldom acknowledged, late-night shows drive profit for their respective
overlords, so much that any show that works against that mission will quickly
be cut. Just ask Larry Wilmore, whose short-lived show on Comedy Central
experimented with pointed debates and continually focused on U.S. race
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relations, leading to low viewerships and an eventual cancellation (Littleton
2016).
This isn't to judge the quality of late-night shows and their writing and
performance skills, but rather to highlight how the institutional constraint of
profit-making limits the types of comedy we're even able to see. Scholars
now underscore how "strong hegemonic elements" can exist within programs
like The Daily Show, creating a ··paradox of sociopolitical comedy" (Anderson and Kincaid 2013, 1). As much as late-night television shows lambaste
public foolishness at every level, they are still part of many of the same institutional structures they critique.
If there's any fault in modem comedy studies, it may be that we·ve been
too forgiving of how, for example, Stephen Colbert relies on advertising dollars to keep his show going. Our political comedians generally do a masterful
job of working within those structures and pushing the boundaries of what
can be thought and said. To Colbert's credit, he has gone from late-night
cable to a mainstream channel and increasingly amped up his political critiques, especially of the Trump administration (Reilly 2017).
Yet the elephant in the room still remains corporate advertising as a necessary condition to continued success. Ultimately, many corporate sponsors are
happy for the jokes, sketches, and other comedic elements to fly thick about
political figures each evening. They know that at the end of the day advertisers will still pay up, pockets will be filled, and portions of these monies
wilLstill flow from their media organizations to those same representatives,
who won "t get in their way when it comes to creating media policies and
regulations.
An objection could be made that these steps are too removed from the
day-to-day operations of late-night shows. But this is precisely where thinking about political comedy from a higher, neoliberal, and structural level
becomes useful. We can certainly look to the compelling comic strategies and
effects that these shows manifest with viewing audiences (Becker, Xenos,
and Waisanen 2010), and how they promote divergent thought in an environment where our corporate and governmental leaders would rather citizens
focus on short-sighted or error-filled narratives (Waisanen 2011). If it's the
case that the funding that keeps shows like Colbert's or even Samantha Bee's
Full Frontal in place trickles up to decision-makers who have no interest in
the social and political changes these shows implicitly and explicitly assert,
however, it's more than a thought experiment to argue that the sum of these
efforts may be as much about neoliberal perpetuation as radical insight.
Although it may seem like a glum prognosis, to get accurate about
the comedy's conditions of possibility, it's worth targeting how comedy
speaking truth to power is dwarfed by the larger neoliberal players and structures who have the last word on political decisions. In the "commedification"
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of the public arena (Szakolczai 2012, 4), armies of writers and performers
produce cutting-edge, hilarious material that makes important contributions
to the public discourse at the cost of sustaining powerful actors whose jobs
are defined by profit and loss statements. There· s a common saying in comedy that "you're only as good as your last joke" (Carr and Greeves 2006,
n.p.). With neoliberalism in mind, perhaps a clarification is order-"you 're
only as good as your last joke's ability to fund this institution and its network
of influence."

SMALL REVOLUTIONS
George Orwell once said that jokes are "tiny revolution[s]" (Orwell 1968.
284 ). Looked at from a purely textual viewpoint, this comment suggests that
Trevor Noah's or Jimmy Fallon's nightly prods at politicians play a small but
significant part in fomenting incremental rebellions. Yet, when thought about
less as a matter of formal properties and more in terms of comedy's structural
milieu. the phrase unlocks another idea: that jokes are tiny contributions to
subversity. What's worse, using another meaning of ·'revolution" (Waisanen
2013b ), they may only bring all of us full circle. revolving to the same conditions we started with.
This idea is worth taking seriously. Among the national and global flows
of finance, the widening gaps between rich and poor, and corporations'
influence on governments (some find the whole point of neoliberalism is not
just corporate influence but to eliminate politics altogether [Brown 2015]).
nightly monologues by Seth Meyers look very small indeed. That the jokes,
sketches, parodies. and more may only bring us all back to exactly where we
began-comedy as a peripheral revolution around a neoliberal axis-lessens
the stakes for late-night shows in the political economy of media further.
There's good reason to position late-night shows in terms of small revolutions. In the United States. as a whole, late-night shows are relentless. Neoliberalism is little without the offer of endless choice and competition (Kotsko
2017), so not only are there many choices to watch at around the same
time-an impossible task-but most shows run just about every week night.
The sheer volume of comic material and choices has its own effect: none of us
can take it all in. Even when a particularly insightful or funny segment from
Jimmy Kimmel goes viral, it's all in the knowledge that another show will be
produced tomorrow-not because we need it, but because relentlessness is
the condition upon which most late-night shows are premised.
A late-night segment might get us to think momentarily about counterfactual political possibilities, but systemically, these shows keep bringing us
back to their same starting points the following day. John Oliver's Last Week
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Tonight is one exception to this trend that further focuses the problem. Hav-

of

ing at least a week between airings has allowed Oliver to create something
more reflective and investigative than what a lot of other shows offer. It also
airs on a channel whose content is less directed by advertising dollars and.
most important, in a Sunday night spot when there are few other late-night
comedy options. At a minimum, by operating off the beaten schedule, Last
Week Tonight offers viewers a bit less paralysis and more distinction in the
overall political economy of media.
That said, a fragmented media landscape only compounds the problem of
late-night comedy as small revolutions. The audiences for these shows are
still small and skewed in the younger, liberal direction. In a national U.S.
poll, the Pew Research Center revealed that 24 percent of those surveyed
found cable news the most helpful source for learning about the presidential
election, compared to only 3 percent for late-night comedy shows (Gottfried
et al. 2017, "Beyond," par 7). Overall, the
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level of usage differed notably by political party identification for late night
comedy shows. They are a source for three-in-ten Democrats, but only 16% of
Republicans and a quarter of independents. About a third of those ages 18-29
(34%) learned about the campaigns and candidates from late night comedy
shows, higher than any other age group. (par 7)
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mostly constrained to a niche portion of the population who are already sympathetic to its politics .
Additionally, although there have been spikes in viewership for the more
politically oriented shows, such as Colbert's and Bee's during the Trump
administration (Nededog and Gould 2017), the least political of the shows,
such as Fallon and Kimmel, tend to skew more moderate (The Political 2016).
If late-night shows that generally engage in political critiques are leftist "echo
chambers" (Jamieson and Capella 2008), rarely preaching to the unconverted,
then the problem of small revolutions becomes even more acute-those
watching the comedy shows always end at the same place they started.
It's not just about leftists only hearing what they want to hear, however.
It's what the other side hears and does on a systemic level with these shows
that makes these revolutions even tinier. Caitlin Flanagan (2017) makes the
case directly: "Though aimed at blue-state sophisticates, late-night comedy
shows are an unintended but powerful form of propaganda for conservatives.'' In essence,
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of Jimmy Kimmel, Stephen Colbert, and Seth Meyers-they don't just see a
handful of comics mocking them. They see HBO, Comedy Central, TBS, ABC,
CBS, and NBC. In other words, they see exactly what Donald Trump has taught
them: that the entire media landscape loathes them, their values, their family,
and their religion. (par 7)

This isn't simply the opinings of a reporter from The Atlantic. Conservative
media are replete with these sentiments (Crouere 2017). While many conservative critiques reduce to the "why can't we get Johnny Carson back"' variety,
and this certainly isn't an argument for Samantha Bee to stop her scathing
assessments of her political opponents, it does beg the question of whether
these shows do much at all in politics. In the political economy of media, if
they are as much a foil as a source of relief, then in a real sense they may
be as nwch about neoliberal reinscription as anything else. Comedy as small
revolutions is a snake biting its own tail, so to speak.
Contrary to popular beliefs that comedy can be revolutionary, practitioners
even underscore how comedy is really ·'small, logical leaps of absurdity"
from extant human-realities, rather than farcical material that · runs the risk
of leaving audiences unable to identify with a topic undergoing humorous
treatment" (Lynn 2004, 10). In this light, it's worth thinking about how much
comedy is up against given neoliberal concentrations of power. For instance,
between 198 J and 2002 Martin Giles and Benjamin Page looked at around
1,800 policy decisions in the U.S. government and came to the conclusion
"that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests
have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while
mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent
influence'· (as cited in McChesney 2014, 14).
Rabelais said comedy could bring down feudal orders. and there is evidence
that jokes can play a role in gradually undermining state regimes (McLeod
2014. I 2; Riley 2008, 69 ). In essence, "Social change can be nurtured, over
decades. by means of rather simple (low-tech, low-cost), everyday communication activities ... in most of the world speech is, in fact, all that the
majority of people possess in terms of persuasive or political power" (Riley
2008, 311-312). Yet even with the broadcast media platforms that late-night
comedians use, which can certainly generate important political talk that sets
in motion social change, we shouldn't lose a sense of scale here.
As Peter Sloterdijk (1988) highlighted, we ·re dealing with "highly armed
centers of private reason, conglomerations of power bristling with weapons
and science-supported systems of hyperproduction. None of them would even
dream of bending to a communicative reason; rather, under the pretense of
communication, they want to subjugate the latter to its private conditions''
(544 ). In the political economy of media. late-night shows may have the
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recursive potential to innovate upon the ground from which they stand, but
they are goaded to incorporate and return to that ground at every juncture.

CYNICAL LABOR
Comedy doesn't often get thought about as labor. Late-night shows may
seem like all fun and games, but the products we're presented with involve
a tremendous amount of work. It's common to hear comedians say that they
had to write ten (or more) jokes just to find one that's effective. In this sense,
there's a lot of hidden labor that also goes into producing, say, Bill Maher's
monologues every Friday night. And that's before all the testing that goes on.
Comedians and their teams adhere to data analytic protocols: did the audience
laugh or not, what worked and didn't, and so on. These are useful yardsticks
for just about any endeavor, but take on a different look when positioned with
neoliberalism' s endless drive toward accountability, measurement, ranking,
and so on. In this larger sense, we should think both about the labor of comedy production and the labor that viewers are expected to perform .
Before getting a job on a late-night show, those who become writers, performers, and others involved in comedy production perform immense labor at
a variety of institutions. Comedians coming from improv and sketch comedy
backgrounds typically put in countless hours at organizations like The Second
City in Chicago, the Groundlings in Los Angeles, or the Upright Citizens
Brigade (UCB) in New York City and L.A. Each of these institutions has signature emphases, such as The Second City ' s focus on doing political satire, or
the Groundlings character-behavioral comedy (Lynn 2004 ).
The joy of working in the craft and the communal structures that support
it generally offer some rewards for all the time spent perfecting material and
performances. But much of this labor is freely given, often for paying audiences, which has occasionally become a full-blown national controversy in its
own right. One of the founders of the UCB commented that "I don't see what
[improvisers] do as lab~r. I see guys [sic] onstage having fun. It's not a job''
(Zinoman 2013, par 21). Trying to get a job in an area where authority figures
tell you this isn't a job highlights a structural cynicism toward comedic labor
itself-a desire to occlude the actual work of comedy as work.
Although it's more of an individualistic craft those coming from stand-up
comedy backgrounds perform a great deal of community labor by writing and
traveling in teams to a variety of institutions, such as the Improv stand-up theaters all over the United States. This labor also involves many jobs at low or
no-pay for a long time period. There's more institutional support for paying
gigs in stand-up in general, a fact that some argue has led to more diversity in
the comedic sub-field than in others (Zinoman 2013, pars 24-25). Once one
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finds "success" in industry (if ever) on late-night shows, among other routes
for a comedy career, this kind of labor is only intensified greatly in the service
of advertising and corporate returns.
While there's much to praise about the supportive organizations and network that can be built in a comedy career. what's critical to highlight from
a systemic viewpoint are the habits and routines that have taken place over
the course of that long labor period. If, as Kenneth Burke (1984) (referencing
Thorsten Veblen) reminds us, we all face the danger of "trained incapacity"
(7) in any profession (i.e., any line of work habitually commits us to acting
and thinking in certain ways to the exclusion of others), then one danger of
comedy as neoliberal labor is its commitment to a constant negativity. At the
core of modern joking is slamming every topic, event, or person that it can
with a negative attitude (Carter 2001). While it's never talked about in this
way, constantly applying a lens of "this is stupid" or "what's weird or unusual
here" (see Besser, Roberts, and Walsh 2013) are the horse blinders of comedy, which are elevated to an incessant level by late-night shows .
Neoliberalism works on a subjective level by. having individuals internalize a certain "interpretive repertoire" of response, such as entrepreneurial
approaches that seek to compete with and reject others as a matter for routine
performance (Scharff 2016, 111, 107). Neoliberalism also operates by trying
to get citizens..to believe that there simply are no alternatives to the present
conditions, with its attendant ways of being, thinking, and acting (Fisher
2009). People step into spaces that are already constituted in certain ways
(Charland 1987), so trained incapacity becomes especially relevant to a neoliberal, systemic view of late-night political comedy as limiting alternative
ways of operating.
As scholars have highlighted, negativity can be incredibly important for
critique, but it can also easily devolve into a relentless, detached cynicism
unmoored from political action or affirmation (Waisanen 2013a~ Hart and
Hartelius 2007). With an endless cynicism, comedy's ambivalence can be a
problem for getting political footing and structures for governance (Waisanen
2018). In the name of institutional returns, we are bid to never stop producing, never call it a day. and never stop laughing as much as possible. This is
partly why we have so much comedy flooding every conceivable space now,
so that even the powerful can't just tell an occasional joke, but must increasingly labor as entertainers. Hillary Clinton's appearance on Between Two
Ferns breaks records but still becomes a routine matter as cynical labor (she
initiated the performance, after all) (Jarvey 2016, 7).
Organizational communication scholars have highlighted the idea of "emotional labor" or "jobs in which workers are expected to display certain feelings in order to satisfy organizational role expectations" (Miller 2015, 73).
Although a waiter or waitress may not feel like it, being "forced" to smile on
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the job can be considered emotional labor. Similarly, there's emotional labor
in working on a late-night show through the pressure to view any and all topics througq a negative lens. Since laughter is the sine non qua of the industry,
laborers must produce or be subjected to laughter as a condition for the job.
If "an essential aspect of power is that it only likes to laugh at its own jokes''
(Sloterdijk 1988), one also has to wonder how much a hierarchy of laughter
is forced upon those who would rather not laugh in acts of everyday labor. As
Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai (2017) underscore, "It may be that we hold
our pleasures closer than our ethics ....
Enjoyment, as the psychoanalytic
tradition has always told us, is a serious thing" (242).
There's also a cynicism about the labor of these shows and their effects
built into the media industry's structure. Many still assume that there should
be hard distinctions between news and entertainment in a new media environment better seen in terms of hybrid features and functions (Williams and Delli
Carpini 2011 ). In terms of late-night shows, Matt Carlson and Jason T. Peifer
(2013) highlight the ''boundary maintenance" that media and other powerful
institutions continue to draw in these matters (333 ). Neoliberal actors and
organizations love late night shows to the extent that they can be consigned
to a separate, cynical, ineffectual space through news and entertainment
distinctions.
As James Caron (2016) adroitly states, moreover, "The postmodern condition exacerbates the dilemma of ethical ridicule that has concerned Western
thought for centuries: its apparent lack of centering norms or standard values
for making comic judgments inevitably complicates the contemporary production and reception of satire"; it is "comic political speech, but it is not
political speech" that can fit within the "realm of the serious speech acts of
policy statements and civic actions'' ( 157). One thinks about Stephen Colbert's testimony in character before the U.S. Senate (Adams 2010)-what of
it, in the end? Inherent to the form and propelled by neoliberal institutions,
"'Because satire is structured as both-and neither-serious and nonserious,
it falls prey to being understood as one or the other, as political speech or as
mere entertainment" (Caron 2016, 165)'.
What starts out in comedy theaters as unpaid labor propelled by an axiom
that "this is for fun, ifs not a job" is perpetuated at a systemic level as cynicism about the labor itself. Studies of the effects of political comedy show
that audiences often "discount" jokes and other humorous textual devices
(Nabi, Moyer-Guse, and Byrne 2007), but a cynical discounting of late-night
in general presents an additional challenge to the political potential in such
work. And, "The more a modem society appears to be without alternatives,
the more it will allow itself to be cynical. In the end, it is ironical about
its own legitimation" (Sloterdijk 1988, 112). Lacking legitimation sets the
stage for the growth of other political platforms; governments aren't spaces
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willing to remain without anyone or anything in charge, at the end of the day.
According to Andres Huyssen, for instance, "The growth of cynicism during
the 1970s actually provided the cultural soil for the revival of the ideological
conservatism of the 1980s" (as cited in Sloterdijk 1988, xii).
Despite the teams that go into producing late-night shows, an additional
fact remains: these shows are still mostly presented to viewers through
their individual hosts. Whether it's Conan O'Brien or John Oliver, almost
every night viewers are implicitly asked to view political comedy's political
potential in terms of a great person narrative that focuses on an extraordinary
person rather than citizens' collective capabilities (see Mathews 2014, xvi).
Along these lines. Peter Sloterdijk ( 1988) argues that "cynicism" as an
"enlightened.false consciousness. has become a hard-boiled, shadowy cleverness that has split courage off from itself, holds anything positive to fraud,
and is intent only on somehow getting through life" (546). It's the difference
between "buffoonery" and "good old nasty satire," the kind that Diogenes
exemplified as a "distance-creating mocker, as a biting and malicious individualist who acts as though he needs nobody and who is loved by nobody
because nobody escapes his crude unmasking gaze uninjured" (89, 4). The
distinction between a toothless cynicism and a productive kynicism remains
useful to thinking about how to speak truth to power. Yet under neoliberalism's terms one fault in this line of thought becomes apparent-it still presents the extraordinary individual rather than movement as the natural loci of
influence for anything comedy can and should do.
Finally, the labor of comedy cannot be separated from its invitations and
interactions with actual audiences. It may seem too obvious, but these are late
night shows, likely the time of day when audiences are least willing or ready
to think about politics in much other than quick, shallow. ethereal ways. The
day is done, so late-night bids for the path of ]east resistance, made material
by laughs signifying that there's not much energy to be spent. After a11the
labor of putting late-night shows together. viewers are too left with a cynical
warrant: '·Don't labor too much about all this yourselves." The comedy and
laughter might be useful supplements or inspiring antidotes to political activism, but it may be too little labor for neoliberalism's cha11enges, highlighting
a problem that Lilie Chouliaraki (2013) has developed at length: we become
"ironic spectators'' and little else.
The system urges us to be "well-off and miserable at the same time, this
consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexively buffered" (Sloterdijk 1988, 5). At the same time,
as much as modern laughter is "the shock of dislocation when mediation is
revealed'' (Hariman 2008, 262). the revealing of mediation can also serve to
relocate and reinscribe one into the same picture again. Like the paradoxes
built into Cecily Strong's character on Saturday Night Live. "The Girl You
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Wish You Hadn't Started a Conversation With at a Party" (Coggan 2016).
viewers consistently receive the same message: it's time to put labor into
being preachy about politics, but whatever happens. don't put labor into being
preachy about politics.

TOWARD COLLECTIVE CHEEKINESS
Examining late-night comedy shows from a neoliberal viewpoint allows us
to see a great deal that would remain hidden otherwise. To this point, critics have seldom addressed the ways that mandates for institutional returns
guide decision making and influence what can even happen in this industry.
The institutional and systemic pressures that make late-night comedy small
revolutions are occluded by discourse highlighting "the power of comedy,"
riddled with questionable assumptions as it is. Nor have we much addressed
the cynical labor that goes into comedy careers, makes its way into institutions, and has become a way of life for many writers, performers, and even
the audiences watching late-night comedy shows.
Raising these challenges is not meant to undermine the many positive
characteristics late-night comedy shows offer public discourse. Amber Day
(2011) reminds tis that much comedy provides sympathetic audiences with
motivation and an opportunity to incrementally build opposition to powerful
forces. A stultifying joylessness is no answer to political dogmatism. But taking a high-level perspective on late-night shows allows us to see what range
of possibilities may exist for radical social critique. In this spirit, I'd like to
offer some thoughts on how late night shows and audiences might become
less limited by the systemic constraints discussed in this chapter.
For the time being, late-night comedy television programming isn't going
anywhere , so I explore the following to find fissures for social change that
might blossom into something more along the way. Given her finding that
"corporate and anticorporate rhetorics do not oppose one another so much
as feed off and respond to one another. ... The market is able to mutate in
response to adversity," Christine Harold (2007) underscores that a productive
"pranking'' of all sorts should address "the patterns o.lpower rather than its
contents" (xxxii, 112). It may be the case that "neoliberalism maintains its
influence on political culture in large part because of its deep embeddedness
in political language" (Onge 2017, 1), but it's undoubtedly in the systemic
patterns and forms of public life that that deep embeddedness thrives . Since
"contemporary commercial culture is dependent on consumers having somewhat routine responses to words and images" (think cynical labor), truly bold,
jarring, and more complex responses not easily reinscribed into present conditions should be invented (Harold 2007. 107). In Harold ' s terms , productive
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responses to hegemony mean "no longer working against, but rather working
with" and "taking the cultural logics of late capitalism so seriously that they
begin to undo themselves•· (162).
Against a paradigm that reduces human beings to atomistic competitors,
one hope for late-night producers and audiences may be to focus on a "collective cheekiness" capable of critique, realistic assessments of the larger structural challenges comedy faces, and an optimism about the possibilities for
many people to construct a common voice around what society most needs.
I construct this suggestion as a counter not only to the pressures identified
above, but also in line with scholarly thought in these areas. In response to the
reproduction of neoliberal policies that isolates and rules via blameworthiness
(like cynical labor), Kotsko (2017) argues for a "conscious collective agency"
and efforts to emerge as a "meaningful 'we''' (493, 497-498, 500, 506-507) .
At the same time, Sloterdijk ( 1988) argued for "a source of enlightenment
in which the secret of its vitality is hidden: cheekiness ("Frechheit," a word
whose meaning lies somewhere between cheekiness and imprudence)" (99100). Cheekiness once had a positive connotation as ·'a productive aggressivity, letting fly at the enemy: 'brave, bold, lively, plucky, untamed, ardent"'
(103). Examples of a politically productive cheekiness in history include
Martin Luther (who signaled frivolity in "here I stand ... "), the carnival ("a
substitute revolution for the poor"), the Bohemians, and above all, Diogenes,
who generated forms of argumentation ··respectable thinking does not know
how to deal with" (117. 101). Just as pompous, sublime war rhetoric can be
bro!:_lghtdown to earth through comic rhetorical devices like "bathos" (Gilbert and Lucaites 2015, 382, 386), strategies for boldness against neoliberal
recitations can surely be found within comic traditions.
Diogenes, of course, was a loner with little time for others, so we should
remain conscious about putting into play cooperative public campaigns. We
also need to recognize how the presidency of Donald Trump has put Diogenes
on the national stage. Trump is an earthy, pretentious, pleasure-seeking, "go
it alone" individualistic mocker in power par excellence. This turning of Diogenes on his head was once characterized as a "master cynicism" or "cheekiness that has changed side." as in Marie Antoinette's sick joke, "why don't
they eat cake" (Sloterdijk 188. 111-112). A way through these conditions
is to draw attention to the patterns of power at play, "approach unchecked
fantasy with caution" (McLeod 2014, 284), and above all, leave our media
cocoons for collective mobilizations.
To get beyond the problem of comedy as small revolutions, citizens'
voices need to mean more than isolated laughs in safe settings. Attempting
to build a common voice, the historic efforts of groups like ACT-UP manifest a collective cheekiness that was hard to miss and forwarded significant
social changes (Christiansen and Hanson 1996). Many anti-Trump protest
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signs created at marches around the United States too rise to the level of an
embodied, public, "collective cheekiness" that laughs, shouts, and speaks
truth to power in real geographical spaces that are hard to ignore (Kurtzman 2017, 4 ). In terms of late-night, Stephen Colbert's intervention into the
White House Correspondent's Dinner during the Bush administration-and
the forming of a satirical Super PAC to draw attention to ridiculous campaign
finance laws-were exceptional moments that set in motion further forms
of collective cheekiness among many viewers and Internet audiences (see
Waisanen 2018).
Crossing multiple platforms with such cheeky comic strategies also
appears to hold promise for countering neoliberal strongholds. Myles McNutt
(2017) has found that late-night show segments distributed throughout the
Internet prioritize a "collaboration common in the YouTube community at
large," with sketches and all manner of content now '·being 're-ritualized' for
online audiences, disconnecting the segments from their linear broadcast context and reframing them for nonlinear audiences in light of this once secondary space of distribution [for late night shows]" (569). At a minimum, new
media provide some opportunities to break beyond vertical media structures
so citizens can repurpose and build horizontal momentum for criticality while
on their computers, tablets, or phones.
Like the other authors in this collection, I have sought to advance scholarly
discussions about neoliberalism and comedy. These are topics easily swept
under the rug for the sake of laughs, careers, and as this chapter highlighted,
to reinforce distinctions between the serious and nonserious that too easily return us to the status quo. They are difficult subjects to navigate, but
as election results continue to indicate, they're now central to how politics
gets done. Ultimately, examining the political economy of late-night shows
reveals that comedy faces many systemic obstacles, challenging us to be
bolder, cheekier, hold more in common, and above all, think more deeply
about the systems in which we are all caught.
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